We exploit Japan's sudden and complete opening up to international trade in the 1860s to test the empirical validity of one of the oldest and most fundamental propositions in economics: the theory of comparative advantage. Historical evidence supports the assertion that the characteristics of the Japanese economy at the time were compatible with the key assumptions of the neoclassical trade model. Using detailed product-specific data on autarky prices and trade flows, we find that the autarky-price value of Japan's trade is negative for each year of the period 1868-1875. This confirms the prediction of the theory.
I. Introduction
This paper provides a direct test of the theory of comparative advantage in its autarky-price formulation. It exploits Japan's dramatic 19 th century move from a state of near complete isolation to one that was fully exposed to the forces of international competition and argues that the case of Japan provides a natural experiment to explore the empirical validity of the theory.
We test the correlation version of the law of comparative advantage developed by Alan Deardorff (1980) . It asserts that an economy's net export vector evaluated at autarky prices is negative.
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In a world with just two goods (see figure 1), this is equivalent to the proposition that the economy will export the good with the lower relative opportunity cost. 4 Generalizing to the case of more than two goods, it is not possible to predict the import or export patterns of individual commodities. However, the correlation version of the law of comparative advantage is robust in higher dimensions. The theory asserts that, on average, a country will import what is dear and export what is cheap, with the valuation taking place at autarky prices.
[ figure 1 ]
An empirical test of this proposition requires only data on a country's autarky prices and its international trade flows. Autarky prices incorporate all relevant information about a country's intrinsic 3 Independent of Deardorff, Dixit and Norman (1980, pp. 94-96) derived the same result. However, their analysis wasn't formulated and developed as thoroughly as Deardoff's. 4 While under autarky the economy's production point coincides with its consumption point (x a =c a ), international trade allows the production point x f to be distinct from the consumption point c f . In Figure 1 , the economy has a comparative advantage in good 2 (or the slope of the production possibility frontier at x f is flatter than at x a ). This implies that the economy's trade vector evaluated at autarky prices is negative, or p a T<0.
3 supply and demand conditions. 5 The trading vector contains all the necessary information about its trading partners. Consequently, the value of a country's trade at autarky prices is a sufficient basis for a comparative advantage proposition. 6 While several previous studies, most notably Huber (1971) but also Williamson (1999) , have drawn upon the Japanese case, their primary focus was to make inferences about the welfare and distributional implications of Japan's opening to trade. In order to achieve this, they focused on a narrow range of commodities and prices. With its test of the fundamental proposition of comparative advantage, this study breaks new ground. Guided by the data requirements of the theory, we have constructed a comprehensive product-specific data set on autarky commodity prices and trade flows. It draws on a rich collection of autarky price data from a variety of historical sources.
In contrast to the often complex and sophisticated product characteristics of goods traded internationally today, the commodities that initially entered into Japanese trade after it opened up were predominantly agricultural or simple manufactured goods. They can be reasonably characterized as homogeneous goods. Since the historical evidence suggests that these goods were priced under fairly competitive market conditions, the observed autarky prices appear to be excellent measures of Japan's relative opportunity costs at the time. The time period selected for the natural experiment begins with the final years of Japan's complete economic and political isolation (1851-1853). Japan actually opened its markets to trade in mid-1859, and the analysis employs trade data from about one decade later (1868-1875) when Japan's external trading regime could be reasonably described as "free trade" and trade data 5 The insight that prices contain the relevant information about underlying economic fundamentals goes back to the pioneering work of Hayek (1945) . 6 The unavailability of autarky prices has been the key obstacle for conducting a direct test of the theory of comparative advantage. Hence, the empirical literature in international trade has almost exclusively focused on models that point to different measurable sources of comparative advantage. Deardorff (1984) , Leamer and Levinsohn (1995) , Harrigan (2003) and Davis and Weinstein (2003) provide excellent surveys of this literature.
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of adequate quality and detail are available. Our finding that Japan's autarky price value of trade is negative for each single year of the sample period 1868-1875 provides strong empirical support for the prediction of the theory of comparative advantage.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the theoretical framework. Section III discusses the case of Japan and provides evidence for the claim that Japan's entrance into world commerce can be perceived as a "natural experiment" that offers an opportunity to test the theory.
Section IV specifies the empirical framework, describes the data sources, discusses measurement issues and reports the empirical findings. Concluding remarks are contained in section V.
II. Theory

Autarky versus free trade: what does it mean?
The law of comparative advantage involves a comparison of autarky and free trade. The static trade model implicitly assumes that the economy's production possibilities are the same under both regimes. Empirically, it is possible that Japan's production possibilities did change during the country's transition from autarky to free trade. Following Helpman and Krugman (1985, p. Applying this insight to this study, investigating Japan's pattern of trade should involve a comparison between the observed free trade regime (1870s) and an autarky regime at the same time period (1870s) that would have prevailed had Japan not opened its doors to world markets. Consequently, we will focus on three states in the history of the Japanese economy. A is the autarky regime that prevailed through 1858 (period one). B is the hypothetical autarky regime that would have prevailed during the early 1870s had Japan remained closed (period two of the comparison). Regime C is the actual free trade regime of the early 1870s used in the empirical analysis (also period two).
Consider a competitive economy with n goods and denote by p t i the n-vector of equilibrium goods prices, x t i the n-vector of equilibrium production outputs, and c t i the n-vector of equilibrium consumption levels. The superscript "a" is used to denote a variable under autarky and the superscript "f" denotes a variable under free trade (i.e. i=a,f). The subscript "t" pertains to one of the two time periods (i.e. t=1,2). In each period, production points are constrained to lie in a technologically feasible production set F t (t=1,2 The identification condition εT≤0 states that that the correlation between changes in autarky prices under a (hypothetical) closed economy growth path and the trading vector would be either zero (i.e. εT=0) or that autarky prices would have fallen, on average, in goods that the economy actually 10 Drabicki and Takayama (1979) and Dixit and Norman (1980, p. 95-96) provide examples which illustrate that, with more than two goods, opportunity costs do not predict trading patterns good by good. 8 exported (i.e. εT<0). The identification condition rules out that Japan's "(hypothetical) closed economy growth" from period 1 to period 2 would have been on average biased towards its importables. Given production conditions in mid-19 th century Japan and the obstacles in the economy to rapidly adopting new western technologies, it is unlikely that εT>0 and the identification condition would most likely hold.
III. Japan's Opening Up as a Natural Experiment
In his survey on the empirical literature of international trade, Deardorff (1984, p. 470) argued that tests of the theory of comparative advantage remain virtually impossible to carry out because "
[a]lmost all countries have engaged in trade throughout history, so that there is no experience with autarky from which to draw data." Japan's economic history offers a remarkable exception. As a welldeveloped market economy, which experienced over two centuries of autarky, it generated a rich record of price data. Forced by the western powers to move abruptly to a free trade trading regime in 1859, Japan offers a natural experiment uniquely suited to test the core proposition of the theory of comparative advantage.
Japan's policy of autarky (or seclusion) began formally in 1639 when all contact between the Japanese and outsiders, including trade, was forbidden. The only exception was a small amount of regulated trade with the Dutch and the Chinese conducted from a spit of land in the harbor of Nagasaki.
This trade had dwindled to insignificance by the end of the 18 th century (Meylan, 1861, pp. 93 and 142) .
In the last years of seclusion, imports per capita were about 0.6 cents, compared with 9 cents in China before it was forced to open up in the 1840s and 5.9 cents during the brief closing of trade in the United
States in 1808-1809. 11 A small amount of trade was conducted through the Ryukyu Islands. The shift from autarky to free trade was rapid and complete. Figure 3 illustrates the steep increase in trade during the first quarter-century after the opening up. 13 Good communications, welldeveloped commercial networks, and national markets in many commodities prompted a substantial penetration of Japanese markets (Howe, 1996, pp. 93-94 and Nakamura, 1990, p. 94) . By 1873, Japan's imports per capita were 79 cents, or three times the level in China. (1) The vector of autarky prices reflected the outcome of competitive markets.
(2) Japanese producers were price-takers in international markets.
12 Revisions to trade treaties in 1866 set specific tariffs and export taxes that averaged about 2.5 to 3.5 per cent ad valorem (von Scherzer, 1868, pp. 381-399) . The treaties allowed Japan to continue a long-standing ban on the export of rice and copper ore and prohibit the import of opium. 13 The peak in exports in 1868 reflects exports of Japanese silk and silkworm eggs in response to the spread of a corpuscular disease in Italian and French silkworms. The peak in imports in 1870 reflects high imports of rice in response to the poor harvests of that year. Trade is valued in current Japanese (silver) yen.
14 See von Scherzer (1872, p.256) and Sugiyama (1988, p.46) .
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(3) Exports received no subsidies.
The final assumption ensures that the identification condition εT≤0 holds, so that prices from the autarky period can be applied to the available data on trade.
(4) Changes in production possibilities under a closed economy from the opening up to trade (1859) to the period when the net export vector is analyzed (1868 through 1875) would not have been biased towards importables.
Assumption (1) addresses competitive conditions in the economy under autarky and free trade.
Economic historians have achieved a good understanding of the functioning of the Japan's economy during the more than 250 years of Tokugawa rule that ended with the restoration of the emperor in 1868. 15 Initially, Japan had been organized as a feudal society. For the most part, manufacturing took place in small workshops of thirty workers or fewer (Takekoshi, 1930, p. 270 and Piper, 1976, pp. 29-30) . Agriculture was carried out on small farms. However, the feudal system initially included guild monopolies controlling the trade in many commodities and restrictions on the use of land and labor. Over the century ending in the early 1840s, the restrictions on trade were dismantled. By then, competitive conditions characterized virtually all output markets. The allocation of land and labor responded to movements in relative output prices. 16 Spectral analysis of the prices of bills of exchange provides quantitative support for the conclusions of historians. By the period 1822-1843, regional integration and monetization had disrupted traditional feudal regulation of the economy (Yamamura and Duffy, 1971, p. 15 From 1603 through 1868, feudal lords of the Tokugawa family ruled Japan as a quasi-military dictatorship from Edo (Tokyo). Already in decline when international trade opened up in mid-1859, the system survived for only another nine years. A rebellion of other feudal lords brought about the restoration of the central role of the emperor in 1868.
16 See Yasuba (1987) , Howe (1996) , and Crawcour (1997, pp. 8-24) for more detailed English-language discussions of the Tokugawa economy. See Nakamura (1990, pp. 90-92) for a discussion of output markets, Hanley and Yamamura (1977, p. 86) for labor markets, and Totman (2000, p. 250) for land markets. 11 422). Correlation analysis of the detailed regional data available for rice markets suggest that a unified market existed even for this bulk commodity in western Japan by the beginning of the 18 th century (Miyamoto, 1981) . Nakamura (1990, p. 94) argues that cotton cloth, a high-value commodity, was traded in a national market with regional specialization of production by the early 19 th century. To ensure that autarky prices most closely reflect competitive conditions, we chose 1851-1853 as the autarky period for our analysis.
[ Table 1 ] Assumption (2) raises the question of whether Japanese producers were price-takers in international markets. Table 1 provides a summary of the composition of Japanese trade for 1868 through 1875, the period when comprehensive trade data are first available. Consider first the markets for imports. One-third were agricultural commodities such as beans, sugar, vegetable oil, and rice. Latham and Neal (1983) document the size of international markets for agricultural commodities such as rice and wheat in the last third of the nineteenth century; the volume traded dwarfed any demand from Japan.
Another one-half of imports were cotton and woolen textiles. Japanese imports were primarily from England, where the Japanese demand was again a fraction of exports to India and China. The remaining imports of miscellaneous manufactured goods would all have been a fraction of international demand during the early period of open trade. Exports were virtually all of agricultural origin and were produced by small farms under highly competitive conditions. Sugiyama (1988, chs. 4 and 5) provides a detailed account of silk, silkworm egg, and tea production, which accounted for about 80 percent of Japanese exports. Indian and Chinese silks competed with Japanese silks in the three main import markets: Britain, France, and the United States. Japanese silks took up 15 to 20 percent of imports into these markets during the first two decades after opening up. Western governments effectively countered early efforts of the Japanese authorities to manipulate the supply of silk available for export. The United States rapidly 12 became the main market for Japanese green tea. It faced competition from Chinese green tea, black tea, cocoa and coffee. Competitive relationships also prevailed in the merchant community that handled the import and export trade. It included 25 western merchant houses and a growing Chinese merchant community that offered the Europeans stiff competition (von Scherzer, 1872, pp. 369-372) .
For those familiar with Japan today, assumption (3)-exports were not subsidized-may appear the most untenable. In actuality, during the twenty or so years after the opening up, government efforts to develop export industries remained modest. Treaties held tariffs to a minimum, and straitened finances precluded subsidies. The government actually levied modest export taxes of three to four percent ad valorem on tea and silk.
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The final assumption (4) asserts that had it remained closed, Japanese growth would not have been biased towards importables during the nine years from opening up to 1868, when the free trade regime was fully in place and comprehensive trade data are available. Given the impetus of economic growth up to 1859, a shift away from exportables towards the goods that accounted for three quarters of imports (rice, sugar, woolens, and cotton cloth and yarn) in the subsequent nine years would have been unlikely. Contemporary commentators offer one assessment of the momentum of growth just prior to opening up. They correctly identified the goods that actually became the leading exports of the 1860s, including tea, camphor, and copper. Only raw silk was excluded because of doubts that production could be expanded substantially beyond what the Japanese consumed under autarky (Hildreth, 1855, p.560) .
Accounts of the last century of the Tokugawa economy likewise stress the ongoing shift of land and labor out of rice into tea and raw silk (Howe, 1996, pp. 40-41) . The lack of land with a suitable climate constrained increased production of another key import, sugar, and the absence of any sheep in Japan prior to opening up ruled out the domestic production of woolens. The low productivity of the hand technologies available to the spinning sector constrained any substantial expansion of cotton textile 17 The estimated rates are for the early 1870s; see Sugiyama (1988, p. 35 ).
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production. The weaving sector had already achieved the productivity gains possible with the adoption of the vertical loom and the emergence of specialized weaving and spinning enterprises by the 1840s (Nakamura, 1990) .
It is also possible, but not likely, that the Japanese could have used the available information on western technology to shift production towards the machine-made products of the west such as cotton yarn and cloth. Even before the 1850s, western technologies were being implemented in Japan, but only with great difficulty. Information on Dutch agricultural techniques was available to the small numbers of those who spoke Dutch, but there is no evidence of commercial adoption of western technologies in manufacturing. Based upon his reading of the attempts of some feudal lords to manufacture cannon and build ships according to western plans in the 1850s, Pauer (1987) argues that the limited technological expertise and the skill set available to the Japanese during the Tokugawa period precluded rapid adoption of western technologies. It is notable that it took fifteen years after 1859 before Japanese weavers of cotton cloth began to use the flying shuttle, a technology offering ready productivity gains that had been in use in England since the 18 th century. The importation and then adaptation of western technologies to Japanese conditions that characterized early industrialization only got underway after 1880.
IV. Empirical implementation
Hypotheses
The methodology of our historical-empirical exercise is based on a simple decision-theoretic framework. As discussed in section II, the theory implies a concrete hypothesis about the sign of Japan's net export vector valued at autarky prices:
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To evaluate the empirical validity of this claim, we need to specify an appropriate counterclaim.
Ruling out that the sign of p 1 a T is random, we obtain the following counterclaim:
Although hypothesis H 1 is not the prediction of any alternative theory of international trade, the data could "choose" H 1 instead of H 0 . Given that the Japanese economy fulfills the textbook assumptions of a small neoclassical economy, evidence in favor of H 1 would require some reconsideration of the theory.
If we were in the possession of "perfect data" on Japan's trade and autarky price vectors, we would be rather confident in making a correct decision with regard to whether Japan's pattern of trade after its opening up followed the law of comparative advantage (i.e. H 0 is true) or not. However, measurement errors that arise from both the "timing of the experiment" and the incompleteness of autarky price data could increase the likelihood of making a wrong decision. Our decision is based on an . In addition, we used approximations for the missing autarky price data that would, ex ante, make the inner product more likely to be positive and, consequently, weigh the decision in favor of Hypothesis H 1 . The aim of this strategy was to reduce the "likelihood" of erroneously accepting Hypothesis H 0.
Although the specification of the alternative hypothesis given in (5) serves as a guide for approximating missing data points in calculating the inner product, it does not lend itself to any probability statements. An alternative counterclaim to the prediction that p 1 a T is negative is that the sign of the inner product is a random event. It seems reasonable to assume that, in the case of randomness, the 15 occurrence of a negative sign is as likely as the occurrence of a positive sign. This leads us to the second alternative hypothesis:
H 2 : p 1 a T is random with Pr(p 1 a T<0)= 2 1 .
( 6) where Pr(·) denotes the probability measure. Since the alternative hypothesis (6) claims that the sign of the inner product is determined by the toss of a (balanced) coin, the null hypothesis in (4) should now be interpreted as saying that the inner product is negative with probability 1. Assuming that the annual estimates are independent and drawn from the same distribution, we can calculate the smallest level of significance for which the given data points would lead us to reject the randomness hypothesis given in (6).
Data description
For the analysis of autarky prices, data from the period 1851-1853 appear to offer the best representation of the "autarky regime" just prior to opening up. Already by the 1840s, economic activity was organized in fairly competitive markets as the economy had time to respond to the easing of the feudal restrictions that started decades earlier. The early 1850s precedes the first treaty between Japan and the west in 1854. 18 For the "free trade regime" we selected the period of 1868-1875. With this choice we aimed to strike a balance between the reliability of the trade data, which increases with time after the opening up of Japan, and effectively capturing the mix of Japanese imports and exports that best reflects the production possibilities existing just prior to the end of autarky. 18 The first treaty simply secured the Americans access to two ports that would be available as coaling stations and as safe havens for shipwrecked sailors. Debate over whether or not to open trade continued through the treaty of 1858 that opened the country up (Jansen, 2000, pp. 174-185) .
For the construction of the autarky price vector, we identified three groups of commodities. The first group of commodities includes exportables and importables for which we could identify reasonably close domestic substitutes and for which we could obtain autarky price information. For these commodities, we relied upon the continuous price data that are available from 1851 through the early 1870s from a variety of Japanese-language sources. 19 These sources draw upon merchant account books, the records of large trading houses such as Mitsui, and the records of producers. The available price series cover about 65 commodities. In cases where the prices of downstream importables were not available, we used the price of the upstream raw material or intermediate good. 20 For products with quality differences, such as silk and tea, the decision-rule dictates that the estimates err on the side of using price data for the higher-quality variety. 21 Contemporary European-language publications and more recent research provide information on the prices of some additional goods just at or before the opening of trade. 22 Overall, commodities for which autarky price information is available make up two-thirds of imports by value in 1868-1875 and about 95 percent of the value of exports. 19 The sources include Nakai (1989), Miyamoto(1963) , Ono (1979 ), Kinyu Kenkyukai (1937 , and Yamazaki(1983) . 20 We substituted a simple unfinished cloth (siraki), for which a complete description was available, for all other finished cotton cloths. This cloth had about the same weight and quality as the chief unfinished cloth import, shirtings. Unfinished cloths of a higher quality sold for from 20 percent (bleached) up to 300 percent (velvets) more.
Applying the relative prices found in Scherzer(1872, p. 394) and Brennwald(1865, pp. 27-32) to imports in 1868-1875 suggests that our approach undervalued the average autarky price of cotton cloth imports by at least 20 percent. 21 This approach was most important for the choice of a price for tea-where the prices available varied on the order of ten times-and the price of raw silk. We used the highest price of "first quality" tea and the price for the high quality fine Maebashi silk (Sugiyama, 1988, p. 90) .
22 About 17 commodities fall in this group. They include minor exports such as seaweed, gall puffs, awabi shells, vermicelli, and camphor. The sources are Great Britain (1861) for the ports of Nagasaki and Kanagawa in 1859
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A second group of commodities includes goods (primarily woolens) that were not produced in Japan under autarky. Pricing of woolens must take account of the surge in the relative price of woolens that began in 1860 with the American Civil War and the drop off in American exports of cotton.
James (1857) provides information on the price of Orleans cloth (which was relatively inexpensive) and middle-quality camlets in 1854. These prices are lower than the prices quoted for similar goods in the consular reports for Shanghai for 1858 (Great Britain, 1861, p. 517). Von Scherzer(1872, pp. 396-397) provides information on the relative market price of other woolen imports; these price data suggest that using the camlet prices for middle-and the higher-quality cloths and using the price of Orleans for the lower quality cloths that appear in the statistics will provide reasonable minimum estimates of the value of these imports. 23 Finally, the calculation of the inner product required estimating the prices of a third group: the one-twentieth of exports and one-sixth of imports for which there were domestic substitutes, but for which price information could not be found in Japanese or contemporary European sources.
Approximating the prices of this group of imports ca. 1851-1853 relied upon adjusting the actual unit values available from the trade data in 1868-1875 for changes in the prices of imports and exports from the early 1850s. Sugiyama(1988) notes that contrary to the practice of many European countries at the time, the valuations of imports and exports reflected actual invoiced values. Exports were valued at the price at the point of export, while imports were valued at the price prior to shipment to Japan. The adjustment uses the indices of import and export prices found in Shinbo (1978, Table 5-10) .
(June and December) and in 1860 (January); von Scherzer (1872, p. 262) for silk worm eggs; and Huber(1976) for the price of cotton yarn, 23 The most important import that will be undervalued using this procedure is "woolen cloths," which had a unit value in the late 1860s that was four times the unit value of camlets.
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The trade data are from the import-export statistics collected by the Meiji customs at the treaty ports for 1868 through 1875 (Japan Bureau of Revenue, 1893). The statistics include over 250 separate goods. Alternative series are available from the reports of the British consuls in the ports, but these data lack consistent recording of quantities and the detail found in the official statistics. A check of the British data from 1869 with the official statistics found only minor discrepancies that would have no material bearing on the estimates presented here.
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Empirical findings [ figure 4] 24 See Sugiyama (1988, pp. 44-48) for a general discussion of Japanese trade statistics during the first decades after opening up. The British recorded quantities of cotton and woolen cloth in "pieces" instead of yards, a practice that substantially increases the potential error in matching net export data from the consular sources with autarky prices.
25 After 1859, Japan experienced substantial price inflation. For that reason we have normalized all price changes using the price index of nontradeables from Shinbo(1978, Table 5-10) . Net exports are valued at autarky prices. 1 and 4) ; the value of imports of woolens (row 2); and the value of net imports and net exports for which autarky price data are not available (rows 3 and 5). All valuations are in terms of the ryō, a currency that was replaced by the yen at par in 1871. The autarkyprice prediction of the law of comparative advantage holds in all of the eight trading years. Note that the result holds in the year of a surplus on current account (1868) as well as during a deficit. Although estimates of GDP for the autarky period covered by this study are not available, evidence on wages and the price of rice helps place the estimates of the inner product in perspective. For example, the (lowerbound) estimate of 180 thousand ryō based upon the vector of trade in 1868 would have been equivalent to the annual earnings of about 5,000 skilled workers in construction in Tokyo or 5,600 workers in agriculture near Osaka. 26 [ Table 2] Under the maintained hypothesis that the annual estimates are independent and stem from the same distribution, we can test the hypothesis H 0 against the alternative hypothesis H 2 that the inner product is purely random. For a probability statement, the problem at hand suggests focusing on the pvalue, defined as the smallest level of significance for which the given sample observations would lead us to reject the randomness hypothesis. With 8 negative entries in a sample size of 8, the p-value is about 0.4%. 27 26 Skilled construction workers in the early 1850s earned about 30 ryō per year (Kinyu Kenkyukai, 1937, pp. 325-326) . Yasuba (1986) notes that workers in agriculture earned about 2.94 koku of rice annually in the mid-1850s.
180,000 ryō would buy 16,500 koku (2,200 metric tons) of rice. 27 The p-value is exactly 1/256, where 1/256 is the probability of obtaining 8 heads in 8 tosses with a balanced coin.
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V. Concluding remarks
The last decade has witnessed an increased interest in exploring the empirical content of neoclassical trade theory. In particular, the Heckscher-Ohlin model-the "backbone of traditional trade theory" (Leamer and Levinsohn (1995, p. 1345) )-has been the primary target of empirical research.
The empirical trade literature typically aims at estimating the "accuracy" of the predictions of the Heckscher-Ohlin model rather than testing a specific hypothesis.
To our knowledge of the literature, this paper provides the first direct test of the theory of comparative advantage in its most general formulation. It is "direct" since the underlying hypothesis is formulated in terms of a country's relative autarky prices. The testable hypothesis derived from this approach places no restriction on what accounts for comparative advantage, whether factor endowments, technologies, tastes, or a combination of them. However, as a trade-off, the hypothesis provides no information about the commodity composition of trade: which goods will be exported and which will be imported.
One central theme of this paper is that Japan's 19 th century trade liberalization provides a "natural historical experiment" within which to test the autarky-price prediction of comparative advantage trade theory. The historical narrative demonstrates that the Japanese economy during the time period of our investigation was compatible with the assumptions of the underlying theory.
As has been noted elsewhere, the domain of economic theory surely encompasses more than the recent past and there are distinct advantages to exploiting the rich veins of historical experience to test the validity of theory (McCloskey, 1976) . The case of Japan provides a natural experiment that occurs in an environment that is transparent by any reasonable measure. External pressure forced a low tariff structure on Japan and precluded the use of other non-tariff barriers that are part and parcel of contemporary trading regimes. The detail of Japan's trading statistics allowed a clear identification of the commodities actually entering trade. The robustness of our findings suggests that the autarky-price 21 formulation of comparative advantage is a coherent and insightful theory that can also be validated empirically. 
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Source: Sugiyama (1988, Table 3-4) .
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Figure 4: Net Exports and Price Changes for 1869
Source: Japan Bureau of Revenue (1893) for trade data and Nakai (1989), Miyamoto(1963) , Ono (1979 ), Kinyu Kenkyukai (1937 , and Yamazaki (1983) for price data. 
